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Abstract— This paper investigates the use of novel hardware 
features derived from the physical and behavioral 
characteristics of electronic devices to identify such devices 
uniquely. Importantly, the features examined exhibit non-
standard and multimodal distributions which present a 
significant challenge to model and characterize. Specifically, 
the potency of four data classification methods is compared 
whilst employing such characteristics, proposed model 
Multivariate Gaussian Distribution (MVGD -address 
multimodality), Logistic Regression (LogR), Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Support Vector Machine 
(SVM). Performance is measured based on its accuracy, 
precision, recall and f measure. The experimental results 
reveal that by addressing multimodal features with proposed 
model Multivariate Gaussian Distribution classifier, the 
overall performance is better than the other classifiers. 
 
Keywords—Security, ICMetric, Authentication, Classifiers, 
Key generation, Multidimensional space. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
     To protect passwords, encryption keys and various secrets, 
applications rely heavily on underlying native security 
platform offered by OS, device and microprocessor 
providers. A majority of these main stream providers have 
been successfully attacked multiple times for example 
Pegasus attack against WhatsApp encryption keys (iOS & A 
droid) [12], Jeff Bezos iPhone hack, Meltdown & Spectre 
[13] (Intel, ARM, AMD, Linux/Windows etc.) and most 
recently SGAxe and Crosstalk [16] targeting Intel H/W.  To 
avoid total dependence on native security features, we can 
adopt an effective ‘layered’ security approach. In this 
research paper, we explore ICMetrics as an additional layer. 
    Identity fraud can wreak havoc on societies and economies 
and this crime is often committed to facilitate other crimes 
such as credit card or, money laundering, mail, bank, and wire 
fraud etc [11]. These frauds affect not only individual citizens 
and nation’s economy but it is a national security threat as 
well.  
    A significant amount of this fraud can be tackled 
effectively if there is a robust way to link users’ physical 
identities to their online identities and the credentials strongly 
bound to their devices. Integrated Circuit Metrics (ICMetrics) 
can play a crucial role here. ICMetrics is a software client 
which reads various dynamic and static (hardware/software) 
feature values of a device and it generates a unique identifier 
for the device [8]. This unique identifier is used to generate 
the key pair of which the private key is not stored permanently 
on the device nor at database. Every time a crypto-operation 
is required, the ICMetric client reads these feature values and 
reconstructs the private key [5]. If the ICMetric client is 
skimmed, then on a rogue device, the feature values will 
differ from what ICMetric client expects, which will result in 
failed crypto operation. This technique eliminates ‘offline 
brute force’ attack [1,4]. An ICMetrics system generally 
consists of two phases, the calibration phase and the operation 
phase. The key steps involved in the calibration phase are as 
follows: 
1. Measurement of feature data for each sample device. 
2. Generation of feature distributions for each feature, 
illustrating the frequency of each discrete value for 
each device. 
3. Normalisation of the feature distributions, 
generating normalisation maps for each feature. 
Then comes operation phase which generates key for a given 
device. The operation phase contains the following steps: 
1. Measurement of feature values for the device. 
2. Application of the normalisation maps to feature 
values in order generate values suitable for key 
generation. 
3. Application of the key generation algorithm. 
 
    The focus of this paper is to propose a novel model for 
device classification and compare the performance of 
classifiers in terms of accuracy, precision, recall and F 
measure on features data extracted from computing devices.  
 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: - 
Section II Introduces device characteristic feature extraction, 
Section III Describes, ICMetric generation methodology, 
Section IV Summaries experiments and results and Section V 
Concludes the paper. 
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II. FEATURE EXTRACTION 
A. Calibration Phase 
      Calibration Phase is useful to extract suitable features in 
pre-production with the aim of giving sufficient correlation 
when combined. By combining device features appropriately, 
an ICMetrics system can form a unique identifier. For this 
work, the unique identifier is a unique random number, with 
high entropy (lack of predictability) to provide the 
cornerstone value, for example if device features fail in 
unexpected ways during the operation phases, this will give a 
reference point from which the acquired features can map and 
combine to provide an applicable key for authorization. 
      Calibration is carried out once per application domain. 
The suitability of device features (in terms on high entropy) 
depends on the nature of the device. In most cases, it will 
include surveying a device for a set number or period and 
gathering stable values. In other cases, it may be variable 
features that are likely to change over time. This leads into 
static and dynamic variables [3]. 
     Calibration phase contains four parts i.e., (a) Data 
Collection, (b) Feature Selection, (c) Feature Modelling, and 
(d) Feature Analysis that describes the processes sequentially 
undertaken prior to build a model. 
     The device characterizations employed by the system are 
known generically as features. Features are a major part of the 
ICMetric system, and the features utilized straightforwardly 
influence the strength of the security provided. The data 
collected from the ‘devices’ described here are the Apple 
Laptops, namely MacBook Pro and MacBook Air. With weak 
features i.e., features which do not change at all with the 
functionality and restricts the ICMetric system in how much 
security it can offer means a feature value is ultimately used 
to identify a device, so the more discriminative it is, the better 
when evaluating the security of an ICMetric system [7]. The 
values of features are dependent upon the usage of the 
machine. Ideal candidate features can provide the basis for a 
secure system that can guarantee an increase to the trust 
associated with existing security protocol. The analysis and 
mapping techniques allow the system to incorporate features 
whose value can change while still being able to transform 
these dynamic values into a unique and static value that can 
be used to distinguish a device. To facilitate this, features that 
exhibit low intra-sample variance and high inter-sample 
variance are selected as a priority for the mapping process. 
Because the values of features employed in the ICMetric 
system can change, the feature behavior and the influences on 
that feature value need to be understood before an ICMetric 
value can be reproduced consistently.  
1) Data Collection 
           The data is collected using code written in Python and 
in a monitored natural environment which gives an insight 
into the behavior of the features during the analysis. The 
features extracted is uniquely affected by each user’s machine 
usage (as each user uses their machines differently). This is 
to allow conclusions to be drawn between the presence of 
background processes for a system resource and the influence 
they can have on the various candidate features being 
analyzed. The features were initially narrowed down through 
a variety of techniques, including the analysis of their 
variance and their correlations with other features to find any 
stable correlations that were distinctive to any set of devices. 
This will lead to greater understanding of feature correlations 
per device in order to exploit their internal relationship. It is 
not just framework measures that might actually influence 
low-level hardware feature values. Client controlled cycles 
could likewise adjust the distribution of a feature. To help 
with this problem, the situation of the device is observed and 
recorded when data are read for analysis. The selected 
features were subsequently divided into sets in order to 
increase operational robustness via the employment of 
Shamir’s secret sharing to allow controlled potential partial 
failure of the system whilst still retaining some security 
verification. 
           These feature sets offer more natural obfuscation and 
are more reliable than individual features and generate 
stronger base for applying ICMetric system [2].  
B. Feature Selection 
     There are three categories of features that are collected i.e., 
CPU related features, speed of hard disk related features and 
memory-based features. Out of collected 30 features, from 
which we create 3 feature sets. Feature sets of a device can be 
sensibly considered into individual sets. Each set contains 
features, which share alike qualities or are affected by the 
same changes of a device.  
     These 3 feature sets consist of the eight, six and three 
features respectively in each set. Each feature set contains: 
CPU related features, speed of hard disk related features and 
memory-based features respectively, to recognize low-level 
behavior of the features. 
Table 1 Lists New Dynamic Features selected to build an 
ICMetric system: 
Sr. No. Feature Name Feature 
 set 
 Number 
F1 Maximum speed for copy function 1 
F2 Maximum speed for scale function 1 
F3 Maximum speed for add function 1 
F4 Maximum speed for triad function 1 
F5 Average duration for copy function 1 
F6 Average duration for scale function 1 
F7 Average duration for add function 1 
F8 Average duration for triad function 1 
F9 Sequential write(block)%CPU 2 
F10 Sequential write(block)MB/sec 2 
F11 Sequential write(rewrite)%CPU 2 
F12 Sequential write(rewrite) MB/sec 2 
F13 Sequential read (perchar)%CPU 2 
F14 Sequential read (perchar)MB/sec 2 
F15 Duration for add function 3 
F16 Quickest  duration for add function 3 
F17 Longest duration for add function 3 
 
   The following are the properties (related to raw features) 
that we have explored to identify the devices uniquely: 
 
1. Correlated features provide higher stability than 
individual features as they offer a predictability of 
range amongst them, this means that there is less 
intra-sample variance. Thus, increasing 
reproducibility of the generated key These 
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correlated raw feature sets as they contribute to build 
a robust system. 
2. The lower intra-sample (samples of the same device) 
variance is needed means the more feature value can 
vary, the harder the value is to map and the less 
stable the value is when contributing to key 
generation. 
3. Higher inter – sample (samples between two or more 
devices) variance contributes to the larger entropy of 
the system 
   The high inter-sample variance and low intra-sample 
variance are examined to observe the potential overlap of the 
data between two or more devices [7].  
C. Feature Modelling 
Unlike static features which can be used to generate a 
stable unique identifier directly, dynamic features require 
statistical modelling to be used for unique identifier 
generation; owing to the fact that they are continuously 
changing, statistical features such as the mean and variance 
of a set of raw data are required in order to generate a stable 
unique identifier, as these values are unlikely to change much 
with time. Since different approaches may be required for 
different feature sets some may be normally distributed, some 
may conform to a multimodal distribution etc. This section 
presents techniques that used to model dynamic features. 
1) Unique Identifier Generation 
The primary goal of an ICMetrics system is to generate a 
unique identifier for each device, which is derived from 
various device characteristics. This unique identifier can then 
be used to generate encryption keys, authenticate the device, 
and detect changes in device operation. This unique identifier 
should have high intra-sample stability (on the same device) 
but low inter-sample stability (between different devices). In 
other words, a given device should always generate the same 
unique identifier, which should be unique to that device [2].  
In order to increase the entropy, feature values from 
multiple features are combined in order to produce a unique 
identifier with sufficient inter-device entropy to be used for 
key generation [8], and that is stable enough that it can be 
reliably reproduced. Feature values can be generated from 
both static and dynamic features, but the process of doing so 
varies for each type. For dynamic features, it is likely that 
each time the feature is sampled, the feature will hold a 
different value. Instead, it is important to take numerous 
estimations of the feature, quantize the deliberate values into 
discrete values, and produce a frequency distribution for that 
feature. One possible approach to extract a feature value from 
a feature distribution is to map every value to a single value 
that is representative of the distribution, for example the 
median of the set. This number would then be the feature 
value for that set. Since we have 17 unique features as of now, 
the entropy is 217 and as we research new stable features, it 
is likely to go up.   
2) Normalization 
In the calibration stage, features which are described in 
Section 2.2 have been utilized. At that point, the data is sent 
to quantize and normalize process. 
If the data measured from device is non-normally 
distributed, it may be necessary to normalize the data so that 
it can be used for key generation. One approach that can be 
used to achieve this is to map the values from the raw 
distribution to a set of values in a normal distribution [9]. 
Finally, a multidimensional normalization map is produced 
dependent on normalized data. In the operation phase, a 
measured data is mapped to multidimensional normalization 
map to form a unique identifier. At last, the unique identifier 
is forward to produce encryption key [14,15]. 
D. Feature Analysis 
To analyze the data, we generate a probability distribution 
graph for each feature to understand how the data is 
distributed in multidimensional space. The importance of 
visualizing the data in multidimensional space, helps 
differentiate between the overlapping data from different 
devices. This will infer the data to be unimodal, bimodal, or 
multi-modal in nature. Addressing this multimodality will 
increase the probability of the devices being recognized 
correctly. The proposed algorithm is presented as a flow chart 
in Figure 1 where component operations undertaken step by 
step to Identify these Computing Devices uniquely and build 




Figure 1 Shows the calibration phase of the proposed system 
 
1) Multimodal Distributions 
After feature analysis, we concluded that multimodal set 
of features do not generate a unique identifier. To address this 
challenge, we divide the distributions into a series of 
components where each component is approximately normal 
and where each mode on the original distribution become the 
mode of its own normal distribution. Simple approach to this 
problem is to apply a peak-trough detection algorithm to the 
histogram of each feature where the troughs split the 
multimodal distribution into separate normal distributions 
(converting this to unimodal) with the peaks forming the 
modes, to decrease the overlapping of data amongst devices.  
 
 
978-1-7281-5546-3/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE 
 
Figure 2 Shows Probability Density Function graph as an 
example of multimodal distribution of a feature where x axis 
represent feature values and y axis represent frequency. 
 
The Peak – trough algorithms take in the histogram data 
and divides the modes based on the troughs of a probability 
distribution graph [17]. This is used to create modes to 
associate samples to their respective permutations. This in 
turn will show the relationship between the features for each 
modal combination. Hence, examining these features in 
relation with each other creates a unique device print where 
these combinations are generated. 
When the following set of sequence of instructions is 
applied to training data in our experiment, some features from 
all devices have normal or multimodal distribution. To 
identify the data belonging to a particular device, the samples 
are taken from each device, then mean and covariance of the 
modes within these distributions are calculated. Each mode 
has its own ‘identity’ i.e., mean and covariance per 
distribution. Each device having multiple modes will have 
more than one distribution to represent it. After this we check 
which mode each of the samples fall into and compute the 
likelihood of the sample and rehash similar cycle for different 
modes. Similarly, a sample from different device is taken and 
if it falls into one of the modes of first device, the probability 
is calculated as a deciding factor.  Lastly, the higher the 
probability of the test data against any device, more likely it 
is that the data belongs to that device. We repeat the same 
process for’ n’ devices. By separating these modes, we 
increase the accuracy percentage of the classifier. 
E. Operation Phase(Key Generation) 
The operation phase starts each time an encryption key is 
required. For this, all features in the three-feature set (as 
described in section 2.2) are dynamic in nature which requires 
statistical/mathematical modelling for unique identifier. In 
other words, a given device should always have unique 
identifier, which is the primary goal of the ICMetrics system 
[11,12]. 
There is a challenge with ICMetrics. The unique identifier 
generated by the device used to authenticate, is formed of 
several device characteristics, having just one characteristic 
change significantly, may change the unique identifier 
although the variation may still be consistent with the 
operation of the device. Subsequently, the device will fail to 
authenticate because basic approaches to combine feature 
values, like simple concatenation, don't allow for device 
characteristics to change. 
 One possible solution to this problem is to implement a 
secret sharing algorithm to combine feature values, which 
allows the unique identifier to be recovered even if a limited 
number of the device characteristics have failed. 
1) Secret Sharing Scheme 
In the case of Shamir’s Secret Sharing algorithm [10], this 
is done by defining a polynomial where the y-axis intercept 
defines the unique identifier, and upon which all of the 
devices feature values (at the time of calibration) lie. Since a 
polynomial can be defined if a given number of points are 
known (i.e., a straight line with 2 points, a parabola with 3 
points, a cubic polynomial with 4, etc.), the y-axis intercept 
and therefore the unique identifier can be recovered even if a 
limited number of the characteristics fail. For example, a 
parabola with 5 total points would allow up to 2 points to be 
invalid and the unique identifier can still be calculated 
correctly using the other 3 valid points available.  
     Next step is how we use Secret sharing concept in 
ICMetric key generation process. What we commonly do 
here is generate unique identifier to pass in as the X values. 
We then calculate the associated Y values to create the points 
needed to reconstruct the unique identifier, or device identity. 
When we need to reconstruct the secret, we can get the Y 
values from where we stored them & read ICMetric values to 
get the X values. Once we have these X & Y pairs, we can 
reconstruct the secret using interpolation. In this way, we can 
only re-construct the secret correctly when enough ICMetric 
values are valid. 
So, we can split a secret into several shares, with a 
threshold needed to be met before the secret can be 
reconstructed. Generating a secret using some form of 
cryptographically secure RNG then using ICMetrics to 
represent the points on the polynomial allows the secret to be 
reconstructed with valid ICMetrics, and also allow the key to 
be revoked if it gets compromised. It also allows us to set a 
level of tolerance in the system with difficult-to-map features 
so the reliability of the ICMetric system is acceptable. 
The advantage of this process is that the ICMetric is not 
stored on the system and the only values that are stored are 
one half of the co-ordinates that are necessary to generate the 
polynomial that produces the ICMetric. The halves that are 
stored on the system cannot be used to find out the polynomial 
that was used to generate them. Interpolation cannot be 
employed without the associated x value for each stored Y 
value, which means an attacker cannot derive the device 
identifier (unique identifier) with the stored data and the 
attacker has no way of knowing where on the X axis each 
point sits. Additionally, a new ICMetric can be generated any 
time the system needs to be changed or reset by repeating the 
process of taking a new arbitrary basis value and passing in 
feature values to generate new Y values similar to replace 
existing Y values, or we can use an offset to update Y values 
dynamically. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
       This proposed method has the ability to generate unique 
identifier. In order to evaluate the model as classifier, we 
define correct classification of unique identifier of the device 
with our model multivariate Gaussian distribution. In this 
proposed methodology we have used other three standard 
classifiers for benchmarking which are namely Logistic 
Regression (LR), Linear Discriminant Analysis and Support 
Vector Machines (SVM). These classifiers are used to 
compare the prediction. We applied the above mention 
classifiers on different device datasets to correctly classify the 
test data based on three feature sets. The performance of these 
classifiers is evaluating on the bases of accuracy, precision, 
recall and F measure. These classifiers are carried out in 
Python language. Python is an incredible mediator language 
and a solid stage for research. The exploratory outcome 
depicts which classifier is best between them.  
A. Classifiers 
This work represents a comparison amongst four 
classification techniques evaluating which of these 
techniques is best suited to identify and classify the devices 
based on the data collected. In this section, we introduce these 
classification techniques briefly. 
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1) ProposedMultivariate Gaussian Distribution(MVGD) 
Each Gaussian/normal distribution is modelled by the 
mean and variance derived from sample data extracted from 
the device. The Multivariate Gaussian defines the joint 
probability distribution which are mutually independent 
normal variables. Hence, a need to examine the collective 
effect of these variables.  Hence a probability of a vector 
belonging to a particular Multivariate Gaussian is calculated, 
where each of the MVGD is defined by the mean vector and 
covariance matrix of the distribution.  
By taking multimodality into consideration, we model the 
data of each device as multiple multivariate Gaussian 
distributions. As we know in Gaussian Mixture Models 
(GMM) [19], the data is represented as ‘n’ mixture models; 
Similarly represented by our classifier as ‘n’ multivariate 
Gaussians per distribution. Assuming each sample belongs to 
one of these multivariate Gaussian. 
The d-dimensional vector x is multivariate Gaussian in the 
event that it has a likelihood thickness capacity of the 
accompanying structure: 
 






(𝑥 − 𝜇)𝑇∑−1(𝑥 − 𝜇))  (1) 
 
The pdf is parameterized by the mean vector µ and the 
covariance matrix Σ.   
The mean vector µ is the assumption for x:   
 
                      𝜇 = 𝐸[𝑥]                 (2) 
The covariance lattice Σ is the assumption for the deviation 
of x from the mean:  
 
                Σ = 𝐸[(𝑥 − 𝜇)(𝑥 − 𝜇)𝑇]                                   (3)  
 
2) Linear Regression(LR) 
The Logistic Regression is a linear classification 
technique conducted for a predictive analysis. When the 
dependent/target variable is dichotomous [14]. The 
classification presents a binomial outcome i.e., representing 
the occurrence of an event or not with values 1 and 0 
respectively, based on data from input variables. This can also 
be used as a multinomial regression which can deal with 
categorical classification like target variable 1 to 8 for each of 
the 8 devices [15]. 
 
3) Linear Discriminant Analysis(LDA) 
The LDA projects the data in higher dimension onto a 
lower dimension space (reducing dimensions). By combining 
the variables in a linear or quadratic manner that gives Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic Discriminant 
Analysis (QDA) [14]. These variables are combined in a way 
that the differences (i.e., the separation) between the classes 
are maximised. The LDA technique is used when the 
covariance of each of the unique classes is the same and the 
predictors are distributed normally.  
 
4) Support Vector Machine(SVM)) 
The SVM model has the capabilities to handle both i.e., 
regression and classification problems. Here the data is 
plotted and viewed in n-dimensional space, where n depicts 
number of features. This is a non-linear classification 
technique which can separate the data from different classes 
via a decision plane. Hence the data which seems linearly 
inseparable, are subjected to intricate mathematical functions 
called kernel which effectively separates the data belonging 
to their respective classes [15]. The complexity of the model 
ensures the higher accuracy and presents fewer possibilities 
of over-fitting.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS 
        This segment presents a discussion of the obtained 
experimental results of the proposed model MVGD. The 
experiments are conducted on the features which are 
explained in section 2.2, this data is collected from the 
hardware features (Memory, CPU, Hard disk) from MacBook 
Air and MacBook Pro. This data after analysis, gives us a 
unique identifier. We used eight devices with updated 
software. For this work, we used data collected from the 
MacBook Air and Pro, Python Code and Microsoft Excel 
used for data analysis. For this experiment we are using these 
devices, where each device contains thousand samples for our 
analysis, Cross Validation method with fold value equal to 10 
has been used for training and testing phases. Consequently, 
all of the records which exist in dataset will affect the training 
and testing of the classifiers.  
       Table 2, 3, 4 show the comparison of our proposed model 
MVGD and other standard classifier LR, LDA and SVM and 
evaluate the performance of the proposed model on the bases 
of accuracy, precision, recall and F Measure defined below. 
Where TP- True Positive (A true positive is a result where the 
model effectively predicts the positive class) – if we can 
prove that a unique identifier belongs to a specific device, 
then its TP  TN- True Negative(A true Negative is a result 
where the model effectively predicts the negative class) – if 
we can prove that a unique identifier does not belong to a 
specific device, then its TN   FP- False Positive (This wrongly 
identifies the data belonging to a particular class) – if unique 
identifier identifies a device incorrectly, then its FP and FN- 
False Negative (This wrongly indicates the absence of the 
data belonging particular class)- if unique identifier 
incorrectly concludes that it’s not the specific device, 
however, in reality it is the device in question, then its FP 
[18]. 
 
Classification Rate or Accuracy is given by the relation   
 Accuracy = 
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁
   (4) 
Recall: Recall can be defined as the ability of the classifier to 
find all positive instances. It is defined as the ratio of true 
positives to the sum of true positives and false negatives. 
 Recall = 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
    (5) 
Precision: Precision can be defined as the ability of the 
classifier not to label as positive a sample that is negative. It 
is defined as the ratio of true positives to the sum of true 
positives and false positives. 
 Precision = 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
    (6) 
F-measure: F-measure can be defined as the Harmonic Mean 
of precision and recall. The F-measure corresponding to 
every class will tell you the accuracy of the classifier in 
classifying the data points in that particular class compared to 
all other classes. 
 F-measure = = 
2∗𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙∗𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙+𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
  (7) 
 
In all classifiers for first feature set which includes eight 
features related to speed of hard disk to copy, add, scale and 
triad function MVGD perform better, its accuracy is 91.5% 
after that SVM perform better it holds 90% accuracy.  
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 TABLE II. For Feature Set 1 classification performance of proposed model 
with standard classifiers using Training-Testing in 10-fold cross-validation 
setup. 
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F Measure 
MVGD 91.5% 74.2% 73.1% 72.5% 
LDA 87% 70.7% 69.7% 68.7% 
LA 87% 69.2% 69.7% 68.9% 
SVM 90% 73.4% 73.5% 72.9% 
 
    For Second feature set which includes 6 Features related to 
Hard disk like CPU usage when writing to disk and memory-
related features like time taken to read memory MVGD 
perform better its accuracy is 92% after that SVM perform 
better it holds 90.5% accuracy. 
 
TABLE III.  For Feature Set 2 classification performance of proposed model 
with standard classifiers using Training-Testing in 10-fold cross-validation 
setup. 
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F Measure 
MVGD 92% 74.1% 73.6% 73.4% 
LDA 91.2% 74% 73% 72.5% 
LA 91% 74.1% 73.4% 73% 
SVM 90.5% 77.2% 77.2% 77.1% 
 
      For Third feature set which includes 3 Features related to 
CPU-related values like the performance of floating-point 
arithmetic MVGD perform better it holds 80.1% accuracy 
after that SVM perform better its accuracy is 67.9%. 
 
TABLE IV. For Feature Set 3 classification performance of proposed model 
with standard classifiers using Training-Testing in 10-fold cross-validation 
setup. 
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F Measure 
MVGD 80.1% 67.9% 64.6% 62.1% 
LDA 57.8% 44.2% 47% 42.3% 
LA 57.1% 52.6% 46.4% 44.1% 
SVM 67.9% 59% 55.1% 50.3% 
 
     From the experiment results, we observe that proposed 
model Multivariate Gaussian distribution perform better as 
compared to other three standard classifiers in the prediction 
of identifying devices uniquely. 
 
     After applying secret sharing (explained in section 2.5.1), 
the result for ICMetric Key generation for Multivariate 
Gaussian distribution classifier were 94%, 95% and 84% for 
first, second and third feature set respectively. This proves 
that our results improved statistically over the previous 
results. 
V. CONCLUSION 
       In this paper, we explored the employed of hardware 
characteristic features to identify electronic devices 
performed the comparison analysis of classifiers for the 
prediction of identifying the device. The device identification 
technique is compared to four alternative classifiers. 
Experimental result show that different classifiers behave 
differently on the same dataset. From the analysis, we 
observed that proposed model MVGD performed better than 
all others for device identification. And our Shamir’s Secret 
Sharing results based on ICMetric key generation for 
proposed model MVGD are quite promising. Overall, this 
paper outlines the method of analysis and mathematical 
implementation using proposed model multivariate Gaussian 
distribution.  
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